Islamic State ( ISIL) rules on owning female slaves, allows for molesting under-age girls

A copy of this pamphlet has been released by intelligence site Memri ( Middle East Research Institute) and the Manbar al Jihadi al- Ilami ( the Jihadist Media Site- https://www.alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?p=406619). The content is frightening and shows total disregard to basic women rights.

Here is a translation by Memri of the pamphlet:

The Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State (ISIS) has released a pamphlet on the topic of female captives and slaves. The pamphlet, which is dated Muharram 1436 (October/November 2014) and was printed by ISIS's publishing house, Al-Himma Library, is titled Su'al wa-Jawab fi al-Sabi wa-Riqab("Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves"). It was presumably released in response to the uproar caused by the many reports this summer that ISIS had taken Yazidi girls and women as sex slaves. Written in the form of questions and answers, it clarifies the position of Islamic law (as ISIS interprets it) on various relevant issues, and states, among other things, that it is permissible to have sexual intercourse with non-Muslim slaves, including young girls, and that it is also permitted to beat them and trade in them.

The following are excerpts from the pamphlet, which was posted on a pro-ISIS Twitter account.[1]

"Question 1: What is al-sabi?

"Al-Sabi is a woman from among ahl al-harb [the people of war] who has been captured by Muslims.

"Question 2: What makes al-sabi permissible?

"What makes al-sabi permissible [i.e., what makes it permissible to take such a woman captive] is [her] unbelief. Unbelieving [women] who were captured and brought into the abode of Islam are permissible to us, after the imam distributes them [among us]."

"Question 3: Can all unbelieving women be taken captive?

"There is no dispute among the scholars that it is permissible to capture unbelieving women [who are characterized by] original unbelief [kufr asli], such as thekitabiyat [women from among the People of the Book, i.e. Jews and Christians] and polytheists. However, [the scholars] are disputed over [the issue of] capturing apostate women. The consensus leans towards forbidding it, though some people of knowledge think it permissible. We [ISIS] lean towards accepting the consensus…"

"Question 4: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive?

"It is permissible to have sexual intercourse with the female captive. Allah the almighty said: '[Successful are the believers] who guard their chastity, except from their wives or (the captives and slaves) that their right hands possess, for then they are free from blame [Koran 23:5-6]'..."

"Question 5: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female captive immediately after taking possession [of her]?

"If she is a virgin, he [her master] can have intercourse with her immediately after taking possession of her. However, is she isn't, her uterus must be purified [first]…"

"Question 6: Is it permissible to sell a female captive?

"It is permissible to buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives and slaves, for they are merely property, which can be disposed of [as long as that doesn't cause [the Muslim ummah] any harm or damage."

"Question 7: Is it permissible to separate a mother from her children through [the act of] buying and selling?

"It is not permissible to separate a mother from her prepubescent children through buying, selling or giving away [a captive or slave]. [But] it is permissible to separate them if the children are grown and mature."

"Question 8: If two or more [men] buy a female captive together, does she then become [sexually] permissible to each of them?

"It is forbidden to have intercourse with a female captive if [the master] does not own her exclusively. One who owns [a captive] in partnership [with others] may not have sexual intercourse with her until the other [owners] sell or give him [their share]."

"Question 9: If the female captive was impregnated by her owner, can he then sell her?

"He can't sell her if she becomes the mother of a child..."

"Question 10: If a man dies, what is the law regarding the female captive he owned?

"Female captives are distributed as part of his estate, just as all [other parts] of his estate [are distributed]. However, they may only provide services, not intercourse, if a father or [one of the] sons has already had intercourse with them, or if several [people] inherit them in partnership."

"Question 11: May a man have intercourse with the female slave of his wife?

"A man may not have intercourse with the female slave of his wife, because [the slave] is owned by someone else."

"Question 12: May a man kiss the female slave of another, with the owner's permission?

"A man may not kiss the female slave of another, for kissing [involves] pleasure, and pleasure is prohibited unless [the man] owns [the slave] exclusively."

"Question 13: Is it permissible to have intercourse with a female slave who has not reached puberty?

"It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn't reached puberty if she is fit for intercourse; however if she is not fit for intercourse, then it is enough to enjoy her without intercourse."

"Question 14: What private parts of the female slave's body must be concealed during prayer?

"Her private body parts [that must be concealed] during prayer are the same as those [that must be concealed] outside [prayer], and they [include] everything besides the head, neck, hands and feet."

"Question 15: May a female slave meet foreign men without wearing a hijab?

"A female slave is allowed to expose her head, neck, hands, and feet in front of foreign men if fitna [enticement] can be avoided. However, if fitna is present, or of there is fear that it will occur, then it [i.e. exposing these body parts becomes] forbidden."

"Question 16: Can two sisters be taken together while taking slaves?

"It is permissible to have two sisters, a female slave and her aunt [her father's sister], or a female slave and her aunt [from her mother's side]. But they cannot be together during intercourse, [and] whoever has intercourse with one of them cannot have intercourse with the other, due to the general [consensus] over the prohibition of this."

"Question 17: What is al-'azl?

"Al-'azl is refraining from ejaculating on a woman's pudendum [i.e. coitus interruptus]." 

"Question 18: May a man use the al-'azl [technique] with his female slave?

"A man is allowed [to use] al-'azl during intercourse with his female slave with or without her consent."

"Question 19: Is it permissible to beat a female slave?

"It is permissible to beat the female slave as a [form of] darb ta'deeb [disciplinary beating], [but] it is forbidden to [use] darb al-takseer [literally, breaking beating], [darb] al-tashaffi [beating for the purpose of achieving gratification], or [darb] al-ta'dheeb [torture beating]. Further, it is forbidden to hit the face."

Question 20: What is the ruling regarding a female slave who runs away from her master?

"A male or female slave's running away [from their master] is among the gravest of sins…"

"Question 21: What is the earthly punishment of a female slave who runs away from her master?

"She [i.e. the female slave who runs away from her master] has no punishment according to the shari'a of Allah; however, she is [to be] reprimanded [in such a way that] deters others like her from escaping."

"Question 22: Is it permissible to marry a Muslim [slave] or a kitabiyya [i.e. Jewish or Christian] female slave?

"It is impermissible for a free [man] to marry Muslim or kitabiyat female slaves, except for those [men] who feared to [commit] a sin, that is, the sin of fornication…"

"Question 24: If a man marries a female slave who is owned by someone else, who is allowed to have intercourse with her?

"A master is prohibited from having intercourse with his female slave who is married to someone else; instead, the master receives her service, [while] the husband [gets to] enjoy her [sexually]."

"Question 25: Are the huddoud [Koranic punishments] applied to female slaves?

"If a female slave committed what necessitated the enforcement of a hadd [on her], a hadd [is then] enforced on her – however, the hadd is reduced by half within the hudud that accepts reduction by half…"

"Question 27: What is the reward for freeing a slave girl?

"Allah the exalted said [in the Koran]: 'And what can make you know what is [breaking through] the difficult pass [hell]? It is the freeing of a slave.' And [the prophet Muhammad] said: 'Whoever frees a believer Allah frees every organ of his body from hellfire.'"    

Who is al-Qaeda's Abu Khaled al Souri?

I just read this interesting bio of Abu Khaled al Souri posted on the rebel website of Kuluna Shurakaa. Here is a quick translation.  Abu Khaled al-Suri died last week  in a bomb attack in Aleppo . The rebel Ahrar al Sham accused  the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria, ( ISIS) of the killing of the al-Qaeda leader.

Abu Khaled al-Suri  was a point of reference for all Syrian Jihadists with the exception of ISIS . He is also know as Omair al-Shami and  spent nearly forty years crisscrossing Jihadi theaters from  Afghanistan Bosnia , Chechnya, Iraq to  Syria. The man was believed to be one of the first brothers of arms of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam ,  one of the founders of Jihad in Afghanistan before becoming the  lieutenant for Al-Qaeda’s  founder Osama bin Laden  in Peshawar. He then moved to Chechnya where we fought,  before combating in Iraq alongside Abu Musab al-Zarqawi  where he also met   Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS. The article states that he was imprisoned in Syria and was set free by regime forces in 2011 after the revolution started.  It seems that Al-Qaeda’s current leader  Ayman al-Zawahiri asked Abou Khaled to settle disputes between  ISIS and the Nusra Front led by Abou Mohamad al-Joulani. He was also supposed to join the Nusra Front, a proposal that was rejected by ISIS, in the backdrop of clashes between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria and the various Islamic factions including the Nusra Front. The article reports that Abu Khaled was very critical of ISIS’s actions which he accused of being manipulated by intelligence services and delegitimizing the jihadi movement.  ISIS threatened Abu Khaled al-Souri of killing him using five suicide bombers, a threat that came to fruition last week. 

First sightings of Milan missiles in Syria.

New Chinese Weapons spotted in rebel hands

http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/thomas-pierret/250613/first-sightings-non-russian-antitank-missiles-syria

Syria's Jihadis

A lengthy uprising and the growing radicalization of the Syrian street have fueled the rise of jihadi fighters. Over recent years, the al-Qaeda franchise has been bolstered by the ruthless violence used by the Assad regime against what started as peaceful protests. Today, demonstrations have turned into a sectarian war, pitting in some instances a “Sunni Umma” against a “Nusayri” regime. This has strong appeal for jihadi fighters from neighboring Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine.
A few months after the beginning of the uprising, bloggers on Salafi websites began asking jihadi scholars for fatwas allowing them to join the protest movement. Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti advised bloggers to join the protests as long as they avoided calling for democracy or any other secular slogan. At the end of 2011, Ousama al-Shehabi, a commander in Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, called for armed struggle in Syria on the Shumoukh al-Islam online forum.¹ This was followed by a fatwa posted by Sheikh al-Shinqiti on Minbar al-Tawhid Wa al-Jihad, allowing for the use of violence against the Assad regime.
In February 2012, al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on militants in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to rise up and support what he called “their brothers in Syria.” Around the same time, Jordanian Salafi Sheikh Abou Mohamad Tahawi released a fatwa calling for jihad in Syria. “I called for any man able to go for Jihad in Syria; it is the responsibility of any good Muslim to stop the bloodshed perpetrated by the Nusayri regime,” the sheikh said in an interview.² Tahawi was arrested a few months ago by Jordanian intelligence.³
Currently, several jihadi groups feature prominently in the Syrian uprising. In January 2012, al-Manarah al-Bayda Media touted the creation of a new jihadi organization called Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), led by Abu Muhammad al-Joulani—believed to be a Syrian national hailing from the Golan Heights. Jabhat al-Nusra holds particular appeal for Jordanian fighters, who lead many of its battalions, according to Al-Hayat journalist Tamer Smadi. According to Smadi , over 25 Jordanians have been killed while fighting alongside JN forces in Syria. While Jabahat al-Nusra has no public affiliation to al-Qaeda, al-Joulani has sworn allegiance (bayaa) to Abu Hamza, one of the emirs of al-Qaeda in the Islamic State of Iraq. Jihadis wishing to join JN need to obtain tazkiyya—a personal assurance from JN commanders who can vouch for their religious commitment and military skills. Currently, however, the group is comprised of only a few thousand fighters—small when compared to the leading Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is over 100,000 men strong.
It remains that the majority of jihadis fighting in Syria are from neighboring countries, such as Jordan and Iraq, and (to a smaller extent) Lebanon. According to Sheikh Omar Bakri, a member of the local Salafi community in Lebanon, there are also small contingents from Libya and Tunisia, as well as from Belgium, France, and Sweden—mostly of North African descent. Based on interviews with Lebanese, Palestinian, and Jordanian sources,⁴ it is estimated that about 100 Lebanese fighters have participated in the Syrian conflict, along with some 40 to 80 Palestinians from Lebanese refugee camps. Not all of those are jihadis: some are there because of affiliations with Syrian families or hatred for the Assad regime, which occupied Lebanon for over 19 years. Tamer Smadi has noted that almost 300 Jordanians are currently waging jihad in Syria, though there is no data indicating what percentage they make up amongst the foreign fighters.⁵
Jihadis from Lebanon belong to a new generation. “Most of them are comprised of youngsters from 17 year olds to those in their late 20s, who have very little Islamist and military knowledge,” noted Nabil Rahim, a Salafi sheikh from Tripoli. Fighters recruit other fighters—as in the case of Malek Hajj Deeb and Abdel Hakim Hajj Deeb, who were recruited by Hassan Srour, a fighter previously of the Farouk Brigade, say family members. Salafi sources in Tripoli—a city home to one of the largest Salafi communities in Lebanon—say that Syrian sheikhs also encourage local youngsters to join the conflict.
Similarly, this trend seems to be taking place in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon—particularly Ain el Bourj el-Barajneh and Shatila. Sources have reported that former members of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, and Jund al-Sham—as well as some former members of Osbat al-Ansar and the Islamist Jihad Movement—have regrouped into five factions, each comprised of five to 25 members. These groups are currently training in the Basatin region with light to medium weapons. Many of these fighters recently split from Osbat al-Ansar and Islamist Jihad because they objected to the groups’ newfound “moderation” and collaboration with “apostates”—that is, the Lebanese army and the intelligence services.
As the Syrian conflict draws in more fighters from across the region, it will facilitate the spread of al-Qaeda’s regional agenda, the goal of which has not been changed by the Arab Spring—to bring jihad to all “apostate states.” Regardless of whether it has the actual means or followers to do so, this further globalization of jihad could destabilize vulnerable countries—a concern already present across the region.
Mona Alami for Sada Carnegie

Lebanese and Palestinian jihadists in Syria

Last month's twin bombings in the Damascus-area neighborhood of Jaramana, inhabited mostly by members of the Christian and Druze minorities, have stoked fears of the growing role of extremists in the Syrian war. In next-door Lebanon, jihadists who have fought in Syria talk about their battles against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

 

Last summer around the month of Ramadan, Abu Ghureir al-Traboulsi spent three months in Syria fighting the “holy war.” "Life on earth is hanging by a thread, the afterlife is the only thing that matters to me, and I can only reach it by waging jihad,” said the young man confidently during a recent interview.

 

Traboulsi and other jihadists are answering a call by hard-line clerics to enter the fight in Syria. In a video message last February, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, called on militants in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to stand up and support their "brothers in Syria."

 

In recent months, news circulated of a migration to Syria of small groups of fighters comprised mostly of Sunni Lebanese as well as Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon. Last April, Abdel Ghani Jawhar, a well-known member of radical Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, was killed in a alongside other rebels in Syria. Other members of the group, which fought a deadly war against the Lebanese army in 2007, were also reported to have spent time fighting in Syria. They were rumored to have joined the Abdallah Azzam brigades, another radical Palestinian group with ties to al-Qaeda that has claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks launched on Israel from southern Lebanon in the last few years. According to sources in Lebanon’s Palestinian camps, the men have since returned to Lebanon.

 

"Palestinian fighters provide logistical support to Syrian revolutionaries, training them on the use of IEDs as well as on the planning of car bombs,” says Hajj Maher Oueid, the leader of an Islamist party in the Palestinian camp of Ain al-Helweh in South Lebanon.

 

Abu Ghureir al-Traboulsi also fought alongside Fatah al-Islam during its war against the Lebanese army. Now his new frontline is Syria. Traboulsi, who is in his early thirties, says he is motivated by two powerful considerations: revenge and faith.  His father was tortured by the Syrian army in the 1980s during the Syrian military and intelligence apparatuses’ 30-year occupation of Lebanon. Joining the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime was for him the obvious next step. The ruling Assad family is mostly Alawite, an offshoot of Shiism, while the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni. According to Islamist sources in Lebanon, many other Lebanese have joined the uprising for religious reasons or due to family or tribal affiliations, especially those in border areas.

 

The open conflict between Shiite Iran and the mostly Sunni Arab countries has also emboldened Lebanese Sunnis to take sides in the Syria conflict. Since the 2005 assassination of Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, largely blamed on Shiite group Hezbollah—an Iranian and Syrian proxy in Lebanon designated a terrorist group by the United States—the Lebanese Sunni population has been slowly radicalizing. "The policy of Hezbollah targeting Sunnis in Lebanon is seen as a humiliation by all. The only way to stop it is to overthrow Assad,” said Taboulsi.

 

“There is a new holy war taking place in the region between Sunnis and Shiites. After Iraq, it is now taking place in Syria,” he added.

 

Taboulsi crossed the border into Syria, joining the Abu Walid battalion affiliated with the larger al Farouk brigade. The latter, a powerful unit within the rebel Free Syrian Army, is led by Abdul-Razzaq Tlass, the nephew of former Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. Both units are mostly made up of Syrians, though they include a small number of Lebanese, Iraqis, Qataris and Kuwaitis. "These foreign militants are mostly of Syrian origin or married to Syrians," said Traboulsi. He participated in several military operations targeting Syrian army barracks as well as one on the headquarters of the Syrian Intelligence services.  Such attacks are usually planned by the FSA’s military council and facilitated by double agents, mostly soldiers still operating within the ranks of the regime forces.

 

While at the beginning of the uprising in Syria nearly two years ago, the role of jihadist fighters was only marginal, it seems to be growing every day along with the regime’s brutal response.

 

Taboulsi watches videos he has filmed in Syria of men carrying Kalashnikovs and RPGs, training or taking position around a tank.  

 

“Every evening we pray before we go to war against the Assad regime in order to be guaranteed a place in paradise if we die,” he says with a smile.  (Mona Alami, USA Today)

The origins of Jabhat al-Nusra?

In an article, quoting abu Basir al-Tartusi (Abd-al Mun'em Mustafa Halima), a Syrian jihadi cleric and theoretician, researcher Francois Burgat underlines the mystery surrounding the origin of the Syrian Jihadi movement Jabhat al Nusra. This is a rough translation of the online speech of Abu Basir.  "I've never heard of this group or those who run it. This does not mean that its fighters are not sincere and genuine. We face an infidel tyrant ( President Assad), who is illegitimate and criminal. He does not hesitate to play all sorts of roles to stay in power - including using the Mujahideen.  He has already used this type of process in the 1980s… which led dozens of young Syrians behind bars”.  Al Tartusi also underlines the fact that regular Syrian can fight openly while members of Jabhat al-Nusra hide behinds masks. He also criticizes the discourse adopted by the group, critical to the Syrian population’s appeal to the international community. Jabhat al-Nusra had previously said that appealing to the  international community was a “rare perversion, an absolute crime, a supreme calamity”.

While there is a possibility that Jabhat al-Nusra might have been originally a spawn of the Syrian intelligence, it is clear now, that with the multiple defections within the secret services and the current chaos reigning on Syria, it has opted for its own agenda…

Over $60 billion needed to rebuild Syria, an opportunity for UAE and Lebanese companies

Syrian opposition groups say they will raise over $60 billion to rebuild Syria. According to Bloomberg, the U.A.E., is already saying it  is willing to help Syria rebuild when the conflict ends,. According to the  article, U.A.E. companies, including Mubadala Development Co., Abu Dhabi National Energy Co. (TAQA), Masdar and DP World are interested in investing in postwar Syria.Drydocks World LLC, a Dubai-based operator of bulk carriers, cargo vessels and ship-repair services, is also interested in working in the country after the end of the war. Syrian businessmen  announced that they had  committed to investing $5 billion in postwar rehabilitation,. Lebanese companies, are ideally positioned to participate to the  postwar rebuilding effort, due to the country’s geographic proximity , close economic and family ties between the countries as well as the presence of the Lebanese banks  on the Syrian market.

The performance of Islamic parties rising to power will define the region's geographic future

Yesterday, I had an interesting argument with an energy expert: are the winds of change blowing over the Arab region threatening modern geography? Will sovereign countries-as we know them today- such as Syria, Jordan, Iraq and maybe Turkey cease to exist in their current form in a decade or two? I believed not, but slowly the idea is sinking in, that the battle in Syria is tantamount to a black hole. One where pulling forces are so strong, they are drawing in neighboring countries- Iraq, Jordan and Turkey at a later stage- in an inexorable spiral. The outcome of the war in Syria will open doorways onto Iraq, a country currently split between Sunnis and Shiites. A Sunni and maybe Islamic dominated Syria will embolden Iraqi Sunnis. After all, the stakes are high in a country blessed with many riches. Jordan would be next in falling into the new Islamic wormhole. If Syria’s power structure was to radically change, it would be very difficult for the King Abdullah to contain possible repercussions. Trans-Jordanians already fear a possible Palestinian West Bank unification with Jordan, which would disrupt the demographic balance in favor of the Palestinian population, already a majority in the Kingdom.  Turkey may be the last to feel the winds of change, nonetheless it cannot remain unscathed, as the emergence of a Kurdish country is becoming day by day an ineluctable reality.  However, one main game changer remains in the performance of Islamic states that have already risen from the rubbles of the revolution. The credibility of Islamic parties is tested every day: can both the Brotherhood and the Salafis meet the promises they have made to disillusioned populations? Are they capable of ruling successfully in a region plagued by corruption, unemployment, slowing growth and poverty? Can they rise-up to the economic challenges? The answer to this particular question will certainly define what road the region will take. Arab countries will nonetheless have to go through a much needed self-cleansing process, one that will be tainted with radicalism, injustice and bloody battles...   

Why March 14 has missed, once again, its comeback

 

Yesterday’s funeral of Brigadier general Wissam al-Hassan was a poignant moment, one that could have created a new-and much-needed momentum for the movement. Killed in a powerful bomb blast on Friday, al-Hassan had many enemies. As the head of the intelligence unit in the Internal Security Forces ( ISF), al-Hassan led the investigation that implicated Syria and Hezbollah in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik a Hariri. He was close to his son and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri. He also contributed to the dismantlement of a network of agents which worked with Israel.  The ISF also played a central role in the arrest in August of former information minister Michel Samaha, who was charged with planning attacks in Lebanon and transporting explosives in collaboration with Syrian security chief Maj. Gen. Ali Mamlouk.

March 14 could have banked on that. Nonetheless it did not. Sunday’s demonstration dovetailing the burial of Brigadier General Hassan was shameful for all of those who believed in the Cedar revolution. Since 2005, the movement has slowly withered away, a pale copy of its once former glorious independent self and yesterday was no exception. Many mistakes were made during Sunday’s demonstration.

1/ The use of divisive slogans:

March 14 could have gathered more crowds and followers and secured the presence of all of its current and former members ( including Druze leader Walid Joumblat) if it had stuck to its original message : putting an end to Syrian destabilization of Lebanon. Joumblat’s speech was quite clear in the wake of the Ashrafieh bombing. He immediately accused Syrian President Bachar Assad of the killing of al-Hassan. Prime minister Najib Mikati, a business relation of Assad also indirectly linked the killing of Hassan to the Samaha affair, a strong sign for any astute follower of Lebanese politics. However instead of pointing a finger to Syria, March 14 chose to call for the resignation of Mikati’s government ( of which the Joumblat coalition is a member) and encouraged its followers ( in the voice of an obscure TV presenter) to attack the Serail.

2/ Don’t talk the talk if you can’t walk the walk:

Hezbollah’s strength on the Lebanese scene is largely attributed to the credibility its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has garnered in recent years. In 2006, members of Hezbollah, Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were able to maintain numerous tents scattered around the roads leading to the Grand Serail for a period of over 18 months. The demands of the opposition included setting up a national unity government. In 2011, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, threatened to disrupt the government after claiming to have received advice from the UN-backed special tribunal for Lebanon that several of his members were likely to be indicted for the assassination. He pulled his ministers out of government and on January 18, disciplined crowds of Hezbollah supporters gathered in some Beirut neighborhoods causing fears among the population. March 14 does not have such a level of organization or a disciplined support base. Its promise of an open ended sit-in will need nowhere. Building three tents across from the Serail does not pose a real threat to the current government and will further hurt the movement’s credibility.

3/ A fractioned March 14:

The speeches of March 14 figures on Sunday underlined its many divisions. During the funeral, a pro-March 14 journalist, Nadim Qteish, called on mourners to head to the Grand Serail. There were also rumors that this call was endorsed by one Future MP. At the same time, Saad al-Hariri, the head of the party, urged protestors to demonstrate peacefully. Hariri later declared that “we want to topple the government democratically and peacefully and we are not advocates of violence”.  The absence of Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani from the funeral of al-Hassan, a prominent figure of the Sunni community was another black point for the Cedar Revolution. It did not go unnoticed, further emphasizing the dissensions within the Future movement and its wider March 14 family.

4/ The absence of uniting figures

Martyred Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri had been loved by most Lebanese. The same could be said of all the prominent March 14 figures who fell at the hands of the Syrian regime since 2005. Damascus’s systematic targeting of the likes of journalist Samir Kassir, Minister Pierre Gemayel and MP Gebran Tueni was careful and calculated. They wanted to strip the March 14 movement of its brain, voice and beating heart. A successful endeavor : today those have remained at head of March 14  are either absent from the local political landscape for security reasons, or perceived as weak and corrupt. March 14 urgently needs to rebuild its core battalions by choosing new young and credible figures who can appeal to a much disillusioned public…

Damascus refuels in Cyprus ( Intelligence Online)

According to an article published by Intelligence Online today Syria is still buying petrol in Europe, by taking advantage of gray areas in European legislation, Syria is still buying petrol in Europe.
Provided they do not do business with the national import companies Styrol or Mahrukat, which are the object of European sanctions, international fuel trading companies are free to supply Syria with oil products. Others have been quick to follow the example set by the Swiss company AOT Trading, which continues to sell Russian petrol and diesel (IOL 660) to Damascus.

According to our sources, one of the traders supplying Syria is the small Cypriot company Q-One Energy Ltd, headquartered at Soboh House, Limassol, in the same building as fellow trader Soboh Pentroleum, headed by Aiman Soboh and which works closely with Russian traders. Q-One delivered two shipments of 30,000 tonnes of petrol to Syria on board the Breeze A on March 11 and the Voyager A on March 22.

The origin of the fuel is the object of much speculation in Mediterranean trading circles. The company took delivery of the petrol from the Cape Enterprise, off the coast of Cyprus. Word in the business is that the seller was a major oil trading company. Since the European Union imposed sanctions against Damascus at the end of last year, all of the big traders, chief among which is Vitol, deny doing business with Syria.

Allied to the regime in Damascus, Iran has taken over the provision of oil products to Syria: in March two shipments of fuel made the voyage from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to Banias in Syria. But, with difficulties of its own because of European and U.S. sanctions, Iran is not a reliable supplier: In February Syria did not receive the Iranian petrol it was expecting.

Iran also transports crude oil from the sanctions-hit Syrian General Petroleum Corp’s (GPC) fields to sell in Asia. Because of the sanctions, GPC can no longer work with Western oil companies and nor can it sell its oil in Europe, which used to be its principal market.

Syrian crude oil is sold in China, which has teamed with Russia in supporting Syria’s crackdown on the armed rebellion currently sweeping the country.

Could the Druze Minority Tip the Scales of Syria’s Revolution

Mona Alami-
BEIRUT, Mar 26, 2012 (IPS) - The Druze stronghold of Sweida, Syria, witnessed
several pro-democracy protests last week. While the movement remains marginal,
it is charged with symbolism: the Druze have long been considered the "spiritual
cousins" of the Alawites, the religious group to which the Assad family
belongs.The question now on the table is whether or not the recent
outbursts of Druze opposition to the regime could be a tipping point in favour
of the Syrian revolutionaries. Over the centuries the Druze minority,
which make up about three percent of the Syrian population and are located
primarily in the Sweida area, also known as Jabal al-Druze (the Druze mountain),
has spearheaded various Syrian revolutions, including battling Ottoman rule and
the authority of the French mandate system. Over the last decade, the
community developed excellent relations with president Bashar al-Assad, who
could sometimes be spotted visiting local Druze families. These close
ties, however, did not make Sweida immune to the pro-democracy uprising, which
has claimed almost 7,500 lives in Syria since Jan. 2011. "Demonstrations
are taking place more frequently although on a much smaller scale than in other
regions. Last week, fifteen protests took place in several Druze villages," Rima
Fleyhan, a member of the Syrian opposition, told IPS. Protests are
mostly taking place in the Sweida capital and Qraya – the birthplace of the
historical Druze revolutionary figure, Sultan Pacha al-Atrash, who led the
Syrian Revolution from 1925–1927 – and springing up more regularly in Chahba,
another city in the Druze region. "While still marginal, the protest
movement is essentially comprised of students, lawyers and engineers as well as
leftists. Since its inception, it always consisted of the community’s elite,"
acknowledged Talal el-Atrache, author of ‘When Syria awakes’, who spoke to IPS
over the phone from Sweida. Conversely, elsewhere in the country, the
overwhelming majority of protestors have been from farming communities and
impoverished areas, with the movement slowly expanding into the upper echelons
of society. "When the pro-democracy movement first started, Bashar
al-Assad met with the (Druze) community’s three (highest ranking) sheikhs
(clerics) and warned: ‘We are both Druze and Alawites, minorities in this
country. Do not get involved in the protests’," activist Muntaha al-Atrash,
daughter of Sultan Pasha al- Atrash, told IPS. According to several
sources, Druze sheikhs tried to contain the movement before things got out of
hand by intervening personally to quell demonstrations in order to avoid violent
repercussion from the government. In spite of such efforts, two local
‘popular committees’ have been formed, affiliated with the opposition’s Local
Coordination Committee (LCC). "We have also formed a unit comprised of Druze
military men," added colonel Aref Hamoud from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who
spoke to IPS on the phone from Turkey. According to a post by the LCC,
the FSA’s Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash Brigades attacked a military outpost yesterday,
resulting in the killing of one officer from the national army and the defection
of 28 soldiers, though this information is difficult to verify independently,
due to the media ban enforced in Syria. Several obstacles continue to
hamper the Sweida-based pro-democracy movement. Security police and "shabiha"
(thugs) loyal to President Assad have been able to disperse most protests
rapidly. According to Fleyhan, the absence of religious centres poses a major
logistical problem for the Druze, since mosques have served as convenient
rallying points for protestors elsewhere in the country. Another factor
accounting for lower turnout at protests can be attributed to the massive
emigration of Druze youth, leaving the region devoid of a group that has been at
the very core of the revolution in other parts of Syria. Experts like
Talal el-Atrache cite several other reasons as possible causes, "mainly, the
ongoing militarisation of the rebellion resulting from repression, which is
diverting the popular uprising from its initial goals," he said. Ashraf
Jaramani, a local resident also involved in politics believes that the deadly
threat of civil strife as well as the Islamist dimension of the protests may
have discouraged the Druze from plunging into the movement. "If Syria
follows Egypt and Libya, who will guarantee the Druze that the Muslim
Brotherhood will not govern the country? What will happen to minorities rights
then?" Jaramani asked IPS. The community is also wary of an
internationalisation of the conflict, in which Syria could become a battleground
for the rivalry between Shiite and Sunni countries. "The Druze do not
want Syria to follow in Lebanese footsteps," stressed Talal el-Atrache,
referring to the decade and a half long civil war that plagued Lebanon from 1975
to 1990. The Druze community in Lebanon has attempted to inflame their
coreligionists. In several editorials in his weekly newspaper, Walid Joumblatt,
the most prominent leader of the community, urged the Druze in Syria to take the
side of the revolution. "Beware you Arab strugglers in the Druze
Mountain against yielding to the Shabbiha in confronting your brothers in
Syria," he said. The Druze leader had also previously called on young Druze
soldiers in the Syrian army to "disobey military commands to kill their
brothers." The Center for Documenting Violations in Syria, run by
activists in the LCC, puts the number of slain soldiers from Sweida at 31, as of
Jan. 25. Others believe the most recent figure is likely closer to 80.
For Muntaha al-Atrash, the Druze playing a larger role in the protests
will be a major drawback for the regime, as Sweida, together with the Daraa
province, form the District of Hauran. The Assad regime, wary of the
threat such a united front might pose, is still attempting to court the
minority. Security forces have avoided killing any Druze demonstrators while
activists say that detained prisoners were given preferential treatment. The
regime is avoiding a violent crackdown in regions inhabited by religious
minorities, in order to preserve the ‘Islamic label’ given to the Syrian
revolution, said Fleyhan. But some activists believe that security
forces are losing patience and will end up making tactical mistakes, which will
backfire as pressures mounts in the region. "When (the whole) of Hauran
rises," predicts Muntaha al-Atrash, "it will be difficult to bring it down."