Security companies eye Somalia

  (From Intelligence Online) -"In anticipation of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, leading private security firms are looking for new business opportunities. Given the major investment that the Pentagon is making at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, some think Somalia could be a good bet. GardaWorld, the international arm of the Canadian security group Garda, is planning to open an office in Mogadishu.

Only a handful of private security companies are currently present in Somalia. Bancroft Global Development is supervising the African Union contingent’s training of the future Somali army, with funding from the US. Another outfit, PAE Government Services, runs the Camp Lemonnier base and carries out occasional missions for the Pentagon in Somalia.

One contract is currently up for grabs in Somalia: training and mentoring the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). The unit, which was supervised until recently by Sterling Corporate Services with financing from the United Arab Emirates, is in charge of combating pirates in the autonomous province of Puntland".

The origins of Jabhat al-Nusra?

In an article, quoting abu Basir al-Tartusi (Abd-al Mun'em Mustafa Halima), a Syrian jihadi cleric and theoretician, researcher Francois Burgat underlines the mystery surrounding the origin of the Syrian Jihadi movement Jabhat al Nusra. This is a rough translation of the online speech of Abu Basir.  "I've never heard of this group or those who run it. This does not mean that its fighters are not sincere and genuine. We face an infidel tyrant ( President Assad), who is illegitimate and criminal. He does not hesitate to play all sorts of roles to stay in power - including using the Mujahideen.  He has already used this type of process in the 1980s… which led dozens of young Syrians behind bars”.  Al Tartusi also underlines the fact that regular Syrian can fight openly while members of Jabhat al-Nusra hide behinds masks. He also criticizes the discourse adopted by the group, critical to the Syrian population’s appeal to the international community. Jabhat al-Nusra had previously said that appealing to the  international community was a “rare perversion, an absolute crime, a supreme calamity”.

While there is a possibility that Jabhat al-Nusra might have been originally a spawn of the Syrian intelligence, it is clear now, that with the multiple defections within the secret services and the current chaos reigning on Syria, it has opted for its own agenda…

Over $60 billion needed to rebuild Syria, an opportunity for UAE and Lebanese companies

Syrian opposition groups say they will raise over $60 billion to rebuild Syria. According to Bloomberg, the U.A.E., is already saying it  is willing to help Syria rebuild when the conflict ends,. According to the  article, U.A.E. companies, including Mubadala Development Co., Abu Dhabi National Energy Co. (TAQA), Masdar and DP World are interested in investing in postwar Syria.Drydocks World LLC, a Dubai-based operator of bulk carriers, cargo vessels and ship-repair services, is also interested in working in the country after the end of the war. Syrian businessmen  announced that they had  committed to investing $5 billion in postwar rehabilitation,. Lebanese companies, are ideally positioned to participate to the  postwar rebuilding effort, due to the country’s geographic proximity , close economic and family ties between the countries as well as the presence of the Lebanese banks  on the Syrian market.

la Jordanie aurait acquis des lanceurs de missile Himar

Selon le journaliste George Malbrunot, la Jordanie, inquiète d'une possible attaque de la part du régime syrien, aurait récemment acquis auprès de ses alliés américains, douze lanceurs de missiles de type Himar. «Chacun des douze lance-missiles de calibre 220 millimètres est monté sur un camion de type Doge et peut tirer une vingtaine de munitions », précise un expert cité par Malbrunot dans un article publié cette semaine dans Le Figaro. L’expert  évalue à quelque 500 à 600 le nombre de missiles fournis à Amman lors de leur livraison, cet automne. L'armée jordanienne ne possédait jusqu'à présent, selon Malbrunot, que des canons de 105 ou 120 mm. Ces nouveaux missiles, lui permettraient de se protéger contre toute infiltration en Jordanie de la part d’une division syrienne.

The performance of Islamic parties rising to power will define the region's geographic future

Yesterday, I had an interesting argument with an energy expert: are the winds of change blowing over the Arab region threatening modern geography? Will sovereign countries-as we know them today- such as Syria, Jordan, Iraq and maybe Turkey cease to exist in their current form in a decade or two? I believed not, but slowly the idea is sinking in, that the battle in Syria is tantamount to a black hole. One where pulling forces are so strong, they are drawing in neighboring countries- Iraq, Jordan and Turkey at a later stage- in an inexorable spiral. The outcome of the war in Syria will open doorways onto Iraq, a country currently split between Sunnis and Shiites. A Sunni and maybe Islamic dominated Syria will embolden Iraqi Sunnis. After all, the stakes are high in a country blessed with many riches. Jordan would be next in falling into the new Islamic wormhole. If Syria’s power structure was to radically change, it would be very difficult for the King Abdullah to contain possible repercussions. Trans-Jordanians already fear a possible Palestinian West Bank unification with Jordan, which would disrupt the demographic balance in favor of the Palestinian population, already a majority in the Kingdom.  Turkey may be the last to feel the winds of change, nonetheless it cannot remain unscathed, as the emergence of a Kurdish country is becoming day by day an ineluctable reality.  However, one main game changer remains in the performance of Islamic states that have already risen from the rubbles of the revolution. The credibility of Islamic parties is tested every day: can both the Brotherhood and the Salafis meet the promises they have made to disillusioned populations? Are they capable of ruling successfully in a region plagued by corruption, unemployment, slowing growth and poverty? Can they rise-up to the economic challenges? The answer to this particular question will certainly define what road the region will take. Arab countries will nonetheless have to go through a much needed self-cleansing process, one that will be tainted with radicalism, injustice and bloody battles...   

Why March 14 has missed, once again, its comeback

 

Yesterday’s funeral of Brigadier general Wissam al-Hassan was a poignant moment, one that could have created a new-and much-needed momentum for the movement. Killed in a powerful bomb blast on Friday, al-Hassan had many enemies. As the head of the intelligence unit in the Internal Security Forces ( ISF), al-Hassan led the investigation that implicated Syria and Hezbollah in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik a Hariri. He was close to his son and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri. He also contributed to the dismantlement of a network of agents which worked with Israel.  The ISF also played a central role in the arrest in August of former information minister Michel Samaha, who was charged with planning attacks in Lebanon and transporting explosives in collaboration with Syrian security chief Maj. Gen. Ali Mamlouk.

March 14 could have banked on that. Nonetheless it did not. Sunday’s demonstration dovetailing the burial of Brigadier General Hassan was shameful for all of those who believed in the Cedar revolution. Since 2005, the movement has slowly withered away, a pale copy of its once former glorious independent self and yesterday was no exception. Many mistakes were made during Sunday’s demonstration.

1/ The use of divisive slogans:

March 14 could have gathered more crowds and followers and secured the presence of all of its current and former members ( including Druze leader Walid Joumblat) if it had stuck to its original message : putting an end to Syrian destabilization of Lebanon. Joumblat’s speech was quite clear in the wake of the Ashrafieh bombing. He immediately accused Syrian President Bachar Assad of the killing of al-Hassan. Prime minister Najib Mikati, a business relation of Assad also indirectly linked the killing of Hassan to the Samaha affair, a strong sign for any astute follower of Lebanese politics. However instead of pointing a finger to Syria, March 14 chose to call for the resignation of Mikati’s government ( of which the Joumblat coalition is a member) and encouraged its followers ( in the voice of an obscure TV presenter) to attack the Serail.

2/ Don’t talk the talk if you can’t walk the walk:

Hezbollah’s strength on the Lebanese scene is largely attributed to the credibility its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has garnered in recent years. In 2006, members of Hezbollah, Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were able to maintain numerous tents scattered around the roads leading to the Grand Serail for a period of over 18 months. The demands of the opposition included setting up a national unity government. In 2011, Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, threatened to disrupt the government after claiming to have received advice from the UN-backed special tribunal for Lebanon that several of his members were likely to be indicted for the assassination. He pulled his ministers out of government and on January 18, disciplined crowds of Hezbollah supporters gathered in some Beirut neighborhoods causing fears among the population. March 14 does not have such a level of organization or a disciplined support base. Its promise of an open ended sit-in will need nowhere. Building three tents across from the Serail does not pose a real threat to the current government and will further hurt the movement’s credibility.

3/ A fractioned March 14:

The speeches of March 14 figures on Sunday underlined its many divisions. During the funeral, a pro-March 14 journalist, Nadim Qteish, called on mourners to head to the Grand Serail. There were also rumors that this call was endorsed by one Future MP. At the same time, Saad al-Hariri, the head of the party, urged protestors to demonstrate peacefully. Hariri later declared that “we want to topple the government democratically and peacefully and we are not advocates of violence”.  The absence of Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani from the funeral of al-Hassan, a prominent figure of the Sunni community was another black point for the Cedar Revolution. It did not go unnoticed, further emphasizing the dissensions within the Future movement and its wider March 14 family.

4/ The absence of uniting figures

Martyred Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri had been loved by most Lebanese. The same could be said of all the prominent March 14 figures who fell at the hands of the Syrian regime since 2005. Damascus’s systematic targeting of the likes of journalist Samir Kassir, Minister Pierre Gemayel and MP Gebran Tueni was careful and calculated. They wanted to strip the March 14 movement of its brain, voice and beating heart. A successful endeavor : today those have remained at head of March 14  are either absent from the local political landscape for security reasons, or perceived as weak and corrupt. March 14 urgently needs to rebuild its core battalions by choosing new young and credible figures who can appeal to a much disillusioned public…

Les djihadistes se dirigent vers le Mali ( Le Figaro)

Selon un article du Figaro, les  djihadistes Mali auraient reçu ces derniers jours des renforts,  des convois d'étrangers comprenant des Soudanais mais aussi d'autres Arabes comme des Tunisiens auraient  pris la direction de Gao. À Gao, Habib Ould Issouf, l'un des dirigeants du Mujao, a confirmé l'arrivée des islamistes étrangers, selon le Figaro. Toujours selon le quotidien, un autre groupe de mercenaires étrangers aurait rejoint Tombouctou, la cité des Saints contrôlée par les Touaregs d'Ansar Dine et par al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi). Ces convois auraient apporte'un arsenal provenant des dépôts saisis à l'armée malienne lors de sa débâcle de mars et des stocks de l'ancienne armée de Kadhafi.

Selon le quotidien Le Monde,  l'Iran aurait averti  son allié syrien que l'éventuelle utilisation d'armes chimiques ferait perdre au gouvernement syrien toute légitimité. "En réponse à une question sur l'utilisation éventuelle par Damas d'armes chimiques et la réaction qu'aurait alors Téhéran, le ministre des affaires étrangères iranien Ali Akbar Salehi a répondu que "si cette hypothèse se vérifiait (..), ce serait la fin de tout". "Si un pays quel qu'il soit, y compris l'Iran, utilise des armes de destruction massive, c'est la fin de la validité, de la légitimité (..) de ce gouvernement", a-t-il affirmé, lundi 1er octobre."

Le Regime Assad allié à al-Qaida , selon l'ambassadeur syrien Fares

Ci-dessous, une traduction approximative de l’entrevue de Nawaf Fares, ambassadeur syrien entré en dissidence contre le Regime Assad et publié par Joshua Landis.

Des factions jihadistes que M. Fares aurait aidées à envoyer combattre les troupes américaines postées en Irak auraient ​​été impliquées dans les attentats-suicide en Syrie. Les attaques auraient été menées sur ordre du régime d'Assad, afin de discréditer la rébellion. « Au début de la révolution, l'État a tenté de convaincre les gens que les réformes seraient adoptées très prochainement. Nous avons tablé sur cet espoir pendant un certain temps. Nous leur avons donné lebénéfice du doute, mais après de nombreux mois, il est devenu clair que les
promesses de réforme n’étaient que des mensonges ». M. Fares accuse le gouvernement
syrien d’être derrière la vague d'attentats-suicide ayant entraîné des
centaines de morts et des milliers de blessés dont deux explosions devant un
bâtiment du renseignement militaire dans la banlieue de al-Qazzaz de Damas au
mois de Mai et ayant tué 55 personnes et blessé 370 autres.
«Je sais avec certitude qu’aucun fonctionnaire des services de renseignement n’a été blessé lors de cette explosion, le bureau ayant été évacué 15 minutes avant cette dernière ».
« Après l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003, le régime Syrien a formé une alliance avec al-Qaïda afin de
perturber ( l’activité) des forces américaines en Irak ». Tous les Arabes ont été encouragés à se rendre en Irak via la Syrie, et cela a été facilité par le gouvernement syrien qui disposait de plusieurs officiers de liaison en contact avec la mouvance radicale. « Le gouvernement syrien souhaite utiliser al-Qaida comme une monnaie d'échange avec l'Occident »

La Syrie : un scénario entre l’Irak de Saddam Hussein et le Liban de la guerre civile.

Bachar al-Assad va sans doute parvenir à s’accrocher au pouvoir encore
quelques années. Mais le régime est très affaibli, il n’a plus la
capacité de verrouiller le pays sur le plan sécuritaire : violences et
attentats à la bombe vont donc se poursuivre comme au Liban durant les années
de la guerre civile. Mais comme l’Irak sous Saddam Hussein, la Syrie aura le
statut de paria. La possibilité d’une "irakisation" du conflit à long-terme semble toutefois peu probable, les proportions démographiques n’étant pas les mêmes. Il est vrai qu'il existe un déséquilibre militaire (en faveur des Alaouites), mais le déséquilibre démographique est par contre nettement en faveur des sunnites ce qui raccourcira sans doute la durée du conflit civil…

Damascus refuels in Cyprus ( Intelligence Online)

According to an article published by Intelligence Online today Syria is still buying petrol in Europe, by taking advantage of gray areas in European legislation, Syria is still buying petrol in Europe.
Provided they do not do business with the national import companies Styrol or Mahrukat, which are the object of European sanctions, international fuel trading companies are free to supply Syria with oil products. Others have been quick to follow the example set by the Swiss company AOT Trading, which continues to sell Russian petrol and diesel (IOL 660) to Damascus.

According to our sources, one of the traders supplying Syria is the small Cypriot company Q-One Energy Ltd, headquartered at Soboh House, Limassol, in the same building as fellow trader Soboh Pentroleum, headed by Aiman Soboh and which works closely with Russian traders. Q-One delivered two shipments of 30,000 tonnes of petrol to Syria on board the Breeze A on March 11 and the Voyager A on March 22.

The origin of the fuel is the object of much speculation in Mediterranean trading circles. The company took delivery of the petrol from the Cape Enterprise, off the coast of Cyprus. Word in the business is that the seller was a major oil trading company. Since the European Union imposed sanctions against Damascus at the end of last year, all of the big traders, chief among which is Vitol, deny doing business with Syria.

Allied to the regime in Damascus, Iran has taken over the provision of oil products to Syria: in March two shipments of fuel made the voyage from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to Banias in Syria. But, with difficulties of its own because of European and U.S. sanctions, Iran is not a reliable supplier: In February Syria did not receive the Iranian petrol it was expecting.

Iran also transports crude oil from the sanctions-hit Syrian General Petroleum Corp’s (GPC) fields to sell in Asia. Because of the sanctions, GPC can no longer work with Western oil companies and nor can it sell its oil in Europe, which used to be its principal market.

Syrian crude oil is sold in China, which has teamed with Russia in supporting Syria’s crackdown on the armed rebellion currently sweeping the country.

Could the Druze Minority Tip the Scales of Syria’s Revolution

Mona Alami-
BEIRUT, Mar 26, 2012 (IPS) - The Druze stronghold of Sweida, Syria, witnessed
several pro-democracy protests last week. While the movement remains marginal,
it is charged with symbolism: the Druze have long been considered the "spiritual
cousins" of the Alawites, the religious group to which the Assad family
belongs.The question now on the table is whether or not the recent
outbursts of Druze opposition to the regime could be a tipping point in favour
of the Syrian revolutionaries. Over the centuries the Druze minority,
which make up about three percent of the Syrian population and are located
primarily in the Sweida area, also known as Jabal al-Druze (the Druze mountain),
has spearheaded various Syrian revolutions, including battling Ottoman rule and
the authority of the French mandate system. Over the last decade, the
community developed excellent relations with president Bashar al-Assad, who
could sometimes be spotted visiting local Druze families. These close
ties, however, did not make Sweida immune to the pro-democracy uprising, which
has claimed almost 7,500 lives in Syria since Jan. 2011. "Demonstrations
are taking place more frequently although on a much smaller scale than in other
regions. Last week, fifteen protests took place in several Druze villages," Rima
Fleyhan, a member of the Syrian opposition, told IPS. Protests are
mostly taking place in the Sweida capital and Qraya – the birthplace of the
historical Druze revolutionary figure, Sultan Pacha al-Atrash, who led the
Syrian Revolution from 1925–1927 – and springing up more regularly in Chahba,
another city in the Druze region. "While still marginal, the protest
movement is essentially comprised of students, lawyers and engineers as well as
leftists. Since its inception, it always consisted of the community’s elite,"
acknowledged Talal el-Atrache, author of ‘When Syria awakes’, who spoke to IPS
over the phone from Sweida. Conversely, elsewhere in the country, the
overwhelming majority of protestors have been from farming communities and
impoverished areas, with the movement slowly expanding into the upper echelons
of society. "When the pro-democracy movement first started, Bashar
al-Assad met with the (Druze) community’s three (highest ranking) sheikhs
(clerics) and warned: ‘We are both Druze and Alawites, minorities in this
country. Do not get involved in the protests’," activist Muntaha al-Atrash,
daughter of Sultan Pasha al- Atrash, told IPS. According to several
sources, Druze sheikhs tried to contain the movement before things got out of
hand by intervening personally to quell demonstrations in order to avoid violent
repercussion from the government. In spite of such efforts, two local
‘popular committees’ have been formed, affiliated with the opposition’s Local
Coordination Committee (LCC). "We have also formed a unit comprised of Druze
military men," added colonel Aref Hamoud from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who
spoke to IPS on the phone from Turkey. According to a post by the LCC,
the FSA’s Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash Brigades attacked a military outpost yesterday,
resulting in the killing of one officer from the national army and the defection
of 28 soldiers, though this information is difficult to verify independently,
due to the media ban enforced in Syria. Several obstacles continue to
hamper the Sweida-based pro-democracy movement. Security police and "shabiha"
(thugs) loyal to President Assad have been able to disperse most protests
rapidly. According to Fleyhan, the absence of religious centres poses a major
logistical problem for the Druze, since mosques have served as convenient
rallying points for protestors elsewhere in the country. Another factor
accounting for lower turnout at protests can be attributed to the massive
emigration of Druze youth, leaving the region devoid of a group that has been at
the very core of the revolution in other parts of Syria. Experts like
Talal el-Atrache cite several other reasons as possible causes, "mainly, the
ongoing militarisation of the rebellion resulting from repression, which is
diverting the popular uprising from its initial goals," he said. Ashraf
Jaramani, a local resident also involved in politics believes that the deadly
threat of civil strife as well as the Islamist dimension of the protests may
have discouraged the Druze from plunging into the movement. "If Syria
follows Egypt and Libya, who will guarantee the Druze that the Muslim
Brotherhood will not govern the country? What will happen to minorities rights
then?" Jaramani asked IPS. The community is also wary of an
internationalisation of the conflict, in which Syria could become a battleground
for the rivalry between Shiite and Sunni countries. "The Druze do not
want Syria to follow in Lebanese footsteps," stressed Talal el-Atrache,
referring to the decade and a half long civil war that plagued Lebanon from 1975
to 1990. The Druze community in Lebanon has attempted to inflame their
coreligionists. In several editorials in his weekly newspaper, Walid Joumblatt,
the most prominent leader of the community, urged the Druze in Syria to take the
side of the revolution. "Beware you Arab strugglers in the Druze
Mountain against yielding to the Shabbiha in confronting your brothers in
Syria," he said. The Druze leader had also previously called on young Druze
soldiers in the Syrian army to "disobey military commands to kill their
brothers." The Center for Documenting Violations in Syria, run by
activists in the LCC, puts the number of slain soldiers from Sweida at 31, as of
Jan. 25. Others believe the most recent figure is likely closer to 80.
For Muntaha al-Atrash, the Druze playing a larger role in the protests
will be a major drawback for the regime, as Sweida, together with the Daraa
province, form the District of Hauran. The Assad regime, wary of the
threat such a united front might pose, is still attempting to court the
minority. Security forces have avoided killing any Druze demonstrators while
activists say that detained prisoners were given preferential treatment. The
regime is avoiding a violent crackdown in regions inhabited by religious
minorities, in order to preserve the ‘Islamic label’ given to the Syrian
revolution, said Fleyhan. But some activists believe that security
forces are losing patience and will end up making tactical mistakes, which will
backfire as pressures mounts in the region. "When (the whole) of Hauran
rises," predicts Muntaha al-Atrash, "it will be difficult to bring it down."

Une cellule salafiste aurait infiltré l’armée

Le démantèlement d’une cellule salafiste-jihadiste au sein de l’Armée libanaise, ce mois-ci, met en évidence la polarisation grandissante de la société et la fragilité de la situation sécuritaire sur la
scène locale.

En début de mois, la bombe explose dans la presse: sept personnes dont deux militaires libanais, auraient planifié des attentats contre des casernes de l’armée, une institution qualifiée
d’«hérétique» par la cellule. Une information confirmée, le lendemain, par le Premier ministre, Nagib Mikati.

«Moustapha Azzo, Alaa Kenaan, Amjad Rafeh, Raëd Taleb et Mahmoud Baraini seraient au nombre des civils accusés d’appartenir au groupuscule», signale une source salafiste. Toutefois, Magazine n’a pas été en mesure de confirmer ces noms auprès de sources officielles.
Selon une source au sein de l’Armée ayant requis l’anonymat, un des soldats arrêtés serait Abdel Kader Naaman, un cadet de l’école militaire en dernière année. Le second soldat appartiendrait à l’unité d’élite des commandos marins.

Selon la source, deux autres militaires seraient toujours suspectés dans cette affaire.
Le dénommé Ali Rachid Hussein, un sunnite du Liban-Nord serait également en fuite. «Ce dernier, accusé d’appartenir à Fatah al-Islam, avait été libéré de prison lors du Ramadan dernier. Il aurait quitté le Liban depuis plus de deux mois, afin de rejoindre la rébellion syrienne. On a perdu sa trace depuis», ajoute la source. Fatah al-islam est un groupuscule terroriste palestinien qui avait combattu l’Armée libanaise en 2007.

Les quatre Libanais seraient affiliés aux Brigades Abdallah Azzam, une organisation palestinienne terroriste qui entretiendrait des liens troubles avec la nébuleuse d’al-Qaïda. Le chef de la cellule serait un Palestinien recherché par la justice du nom de Abou Mohammed Tawfiq Taha, résidant
actuellement dans le camp palestinien de Aïn el-Hélwé. «Abdel Kader Naaman aurait été mis sous surveillance après avoir envoyé son ordinateur à formater chez un de ses amis, également soldat. Ce dernier l’aurait dénoncé à ses supérieurs après avoir visionné des vidéos suspectes», affirme la source militaire. L’armée contrôlait également les appels téléphoniques d’Abou Mohammed Tawfiq Taha, qui serait entré en contact avec les soldats, ce qui aurait permis de faire le lien entre les différents suspects.

Selon certaines sources palestiniennes, Taha résiderait toujours dans le quartier de Safouri, situé non loin de la Rue du Marché dans le camp de Ain el-Helwé. Cet ancien membre du groupuscule terroriste Osbat al-Ansar, proche de l’organisation radicale de Jound al-Cham serait secondé par un dénommé Ziad al-Naaj. Il aurait été en contact à maintes reprises avec le chef d’Al-Qaïda,
Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Abdel Kader Naaman aurait été endoctriné au jihadisme takfiri par son frère, un cheikh salafiste, affirme-t-on dans les milieux de l’armée. Une information toutefois réfutée par la source salafiste
précitée, qui insiste sur le fait qu’aucun «imam de ce nom n’existe au sein de la communauté». Des informations également en contradiction avec celles publiées par al-Akhbar qui souligne que R.T. (Raed Taleb) aurait rencontré Taha sur des sites jihadistes. Raëd Taleb et Amjad Rafeh ainsi que M.Kh.A (Magazine n’a pu obtenir ce dernier nom, susceptible toutefois d’être celui de Moustapha Azzo) auraient reçu une formation sur la fabrication d’engins explosifs improvisés à Aïn el-Hélwé. Raëd Taleb serait également un ami de longue date de l’élève-officier Naaman.
Les deux militaires avaient pour mission de déceler une faille quelconque dans le système sécuritaire de leur caserne afin de pouvoir y introduire les explosifs destinés à une opération terroriste.

Selon As-Safir, le cadet aurait admis qu'il s’apprêtait à mener une attaque terroriste contre l'école militaire. Un autre attentat visant la base militaire de Halat aurait également été envisagé.
«A Tripoli, des membres de la communauté salafiste arguent toutefois que les membres présumés de cette cellule seraient en fait des partisans de l’opposition syrienne. En ce qui nous concerne, nous sommes opposés à tout plan visant à déstabiliser l’Armée libanaise», explique
le cheikh salafiste, Nabil Rahim.

L’infiltration de l’armée par des éléments subversifs, motivés par des croyances religieuses extrémistes, met en exergue les risques que pose le manque de cohésion nationale et identitaire
pour le Liban. Un signe précurseur des dangers qui guettent le pays du Cèdre, qu’à leur habitude nos élus prendront sans doute bien soin d’ignorer. Mona Alami pour Magazine.