Tuesday, July 9, 2013

L’emprise de l’ Iran ainsi que la nature sectaire du conflit se précisent en Syrie


L’emprise de l’ Iran ainsi que la nature sectaire du conflit se précisent en Syrie selon deux articles du Monde. Selon Christophe Ayad, le remaniement des hautes instances du parti Baas à Damas annoncé lundi 8 juillet, après plus de deux ans d'un soulèvement contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad  signale la sortie politique Farouk Al-Chareh du comité central ainsi que d’ autres figures sunnites. «Vétéran de la diplomatie syrienne sous Hafez Al-Assad, ce sunnite de 74 ans, originaire de Deraa, est le vice-président de Bachar Al-Assad. M. Al-Chareh avait exprimé ses réticences sur la stratégie répressive choisie par le régime, notamment contre sa ville natale de Deraa, berceau du soulèvement. Son nom a été régulièrement cité pour mener des négociations au nom du régime ou pour diriger un gouvernement de transition en cas d'accord politique » .

Son éviction, ainsi que celle d'autres personnalités sunnites s’est faite au profit d'alaouites, une secte chiite à laquelle appartient le clan Assad . Selon Jean pierre Filiu,  la victoire remportée le 5 juin, par le Hezbollah, dans la ville de Qoussair, représente également un tournant de la crise syrienne. Elle ne signifie pourtant pas que Bachar Al-Assad a repris la main sur les rebelles en Syrie, mais au contraire qu'il l'a perdue au profit de l'Iran et de ses supplétifs libanais. «  Car l'essentiel de la contre-insurrection urbaine est assuré par les commandos du Hezbollah, encadrés par les pasdarans iraniens – "gardiens de la révolution" – alors que l'armée du dictateur syrien assure le soutien de l'artillerie et de ses blindés » . Ce contrôle opérationnel de la part de l’Iran a été démontré en janvier, lorsque a eu lieu la libération de 48 ressortissants iraniens par la guérilla syrienne en échange de plus de 2 000 prisonniers aux mains du régime Assad.

Friday, June 21, 2013

The Taliban in Qatar

The Taliban opened this Tuesday in Diha, Qatar, a representative office for the promotion of the  a world dialogue A dozen Taliban and Qatari officials were present at the inauguration ceremony of the "political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." The Special Envoy of the United States to Afghanistan and Pakistan, James Dobbins, is expected this week in Qatar, according to French daily Le Figaro.

Égypte : les Frères musulmans prennent le risque de l'explosion démographique ( Le Figaro)

Après des années de stagnation, le taux de natalité a frôlé les 31 pour 1000 habitants en 2012. Mais le sujet ne semble pas préoccuper le gouvernement Morsi.

Faut-il y voir la onzième plaie d'Égypte? Dans ce pays de 84 millions d'habitants, frappé de plein fouet par la crise économique, un nouveau fléau vient s'ajouter à la longue liste des problèmes: l'expansion démographique.
Si les experts s'inquiètent d'une courbe des naissances à la hausse depuis la révolution, après des années de stagnation, les islamistes au pouvoir ne semblent pas s'en affoler. Au contraire. «Le planning familial ne fait pas partie de leurs priorités. Sous Moubarak, on en entendait parler à longueur de temps. Depuis l'élection du président Morsi il y a deux ans, aucun représentant politique n'a abordé publiquement la question», observe Atef el-Shitany, le directeur du Centre national de la population. Les dernières statistiques en vigueur ne sont pas encourageantes. En 2012, le taux de natalité a frôlé les 31 pour 1000 habitants, soit le même niveau qu'au début des années 1990. En un an, la population égyptienne s'est ainsi accrue de 2,6 millions de nouvelles bouches à nourrir.
Au pays des pharaons, les politiques de contrôle des naissances remontent aux années 1960, sous Nasser. À partir des années 1970, les aides internationales (dont celles de l'USAID) permirent d'ouvrir des cliniques, d'informer les femmes sur les moyens de contraception et sur leurs droits en matière de reproduction - autant de mesures qui firent fléchir la natalité, alors évaluée à 7 enfants par femme.
Mais ces initiatives, perçues comme une occidentalisation forcée et un signe de népotisme, se heurtèrent à la résistance des milieux traditionnels. Certains imputent également aux Frères musulmans, alors actifs dans l'ombre au sein des hôpitaux et des organisations caritatives, le torpillage du planning familial de l'époque.

Parvenus sur le devant de la scène, ces derniers tiennent aujourd'hui un discours ambigu lorsqu'on les sonde sur la question. «Imposer un nombre limité d'enfants à chaque femme est une atteinte à l'islam». Le Figaro

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Syria's Jihadis

A lengthy uprising and the growing radicalization of the Syrian street have fueled the rise of jihadi fighters. Over recent years, the al-Qaeda franchise has been bolstered by the ruthless violence used by the Assad regime against what started as peaceful protests. Today, demonstrations have turned into a sectarian war, pitting in some instances a “Sunni Umma” against a “Nusayri” regime. This has strong appeal for jihadi fighters from neighboring Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine.
A few months after the beginning of the uprising, bloggers on Salafi websites began asking jihadi scholars for fatwas allowing them to join the protest movement. Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti advised bloggers to join the protests as long as they avoided calling for democracy or any other secular slogan. At the end of 2011, Ousama al-Shehabi, a commander in Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, called for armed struggle in Syria on the Shumoukh al-Islam online forum.1 This was followed by a fatwa posted by Sheikh al-Shinqiti on Minbar al-Tawhid Wa al-Jihad, allowing for the use of violence against the Assad regime.
In February 2012, al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on militants in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to rise up and support what he called “their brothers in Syria.” Around the same time, Jordanian Salafi Sheikh Abou Mohamad Tahawi released a fatwa calling for jihad in Syria. “I called for any man able to go for Jihad in Syria; it is the responsibility of any good Muslim to stop the bloodshed perpetrated by the Nusayri regime,” the sheikh said in an interview.2 Tahawi was arrested a few months ago by Jordanian intelligence.3
Currently, several jihadi groups feature prominently in the Syrian uprising. In January 2012, al-Manarah al-Bayda Media touted the creation of a new jihadi organization called Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), led by Abu Muhammad al-Joulani—believed to be a Syrian national hailing from the Golan Heights. Jabhat al-Nusra holds particular appeal for Jordanian fighters, who lead many of its battalions, according to Al-Hayat journalist Tamer Smadi. According to Smadi , over 25 Jordanians have been killed while fighting alongside JN forces in Syria. While Jabahat al-Nusra has no public affiliation to al-Qaeda, al-Joulani has sworn allegiance (bayaa) to Abu Hamza, one of the emirs of al-Qaeda in the Islamic State of Iraq. Jihadis wishing to join JN need to obtain tazkiyya—a personal assurance from JN commanders who can vouch for their religious commitment and military skills. Currently, however, the group is comprised of only a few thousand fighters—small when compared to the leading Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is over 100,000 men strong.
It remains that the majority of jihadis fighting in Syria are from neighboring countries, such as Jordan and Iraq, and (to a smaller extent) Lebanon. According to Sheikh Omar Bakri, a member of the local Salafi community in Lebanon, there are also small contingents from Libya and Tunisia, as well as from Belgium, France, and Sweden—mostly of North African descent. Based on interviews with Lebanese, Palestinian, and Jordanian sources,4 it is estimated that about 100 Lebanese fighters have participated in the Syrian conflict, along with some 40 to 80 Palestinians from Lebanese refugee camps. Not all of those are jihadis: some are there because of affiliations with Syrian families or hatred for the Assad regime, which occupied Lebanon for over 19 years. Tamer Smadi has noted that almost 300 Jordanians are currently waging jihad in Syria, though there is no data indicating what percentage they make up amongst the foreign fighters.5
Jihadis from Lebanon belong to a new generation. “Most of them are comprised of youngsters from 17 year olds to those in their late 20s, who have very little Islamist and military knowledge,” noted Nabil Rahim, a Salafi sheikh from Tripoli. Fighters recruit other fighters—as in the case of Malek Hajj Deeb and Abdel Hakim Hajj Deeb, who were recruited by Hassan Srour, a fighter previously of the Farouk Brigade, say family members. Salafi sources in Tripoli—a city home to one of the largest Salafi communities in Lebanon—say that Syrian sheikhs also encourage local youngsters to join the conflict.
Similarly, this trend seems to be taking place in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon—particularly Ain el Bourj el-Barajneh and Shatila. Sources have reported that former members of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam, and Jund al-Sham—as well as some former members of Osbat al-Ansar and the Islamist Jihad Movement—have regrouped into five factions, each comprised of five to 25 members. These groups are currently training in the Basatin region with light to medium weapons. Many of these fighters recently split from Osbat al-Ansar and Islamist Jihad because they objected to the groups’ newfound “moderation” and collaboration with “apostates”—that is, the Lebanese army and the intelligence services.
As the Syrian conflict draws in more fighters from across the region, it will facilitate the spread of al-Qaeda’s regional agenda, the goal of which has not been changed by the Arab Spring—to bring jihad to all “apostate states.” Regardless of whether it has the actual means or followers to do so, this further globalization of jihad could destabilize vulnerable countries—a concern already present across the region.
Mona Alami for Sada Carnegie

Filière radicale au Canada

Interrogé récemment par Le Figaro a propos des attentats de Boston, l'ancien patron de l'antiterrorisme en France, Jean-Louis Bruguière, attirait l'attention sur la filière djihadiste au Canada, particulièrement active selon lui. «L'opération contre la base pétrolière de BP en Algérie, en janvier dernier, agrégeait deux islamistes venus du Canada», expliquait l'ancien magistrat, avant d'ajouter: «L'opération terroriste de Mogadiscio, le 14 avril dernier, qui fit 34 morts, avait été pilotée également par un Canadien et en incluait un autre dans le commando.»l rappelait alors que «c'est aussi par le Canada que Hamed Ressam avait tenté de passer pour réaliser un attentat contre l'aéroport de Los Angeles en 1999, en prélude aux actions du 11 septembre 2001». Selon lui, le nord des États-Unis, avec sa frontière terrestre, est «perméable». Une analyse qui sonne aujourd'hui comme une prémonition, selon Le Figaro.

Friday, January 4, 2013

Lebanese and Palestinian jihadists in Syria


Last month's twin bombings in the Damascus-area neighborhood of Jaramana, inhabited mostly by members of the Christian and Druze minorities, have stoked fears of the growing role of extremists in the Syrian war. In next-door Lebanon, jihadists who have fought in Syria talk about their battles against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

 

Last summer around the month of Ramadan, Abu Ghureir al-Traboulsi spent three months in Syria fighting the “holy war.” "Life on earth is hanging by a thread, the afterlife is the only thing that matters to me, and I can only reach it by waging jihad,” said the young man confidently during a recent interview.

 

Traboulsi and other jihadists are answering a call by hard-line clerics to enter the fight in Syria. In a video message last February, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, called on militants in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to stand up and support their "brothers in Syria."

 

In recent months, news circulated of a migration to Syria of small groups of fighters comprised mostly of Sunni Lebanese as well as Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon. Last April, Abdel Ghani Jawhar, a well-known member of radical Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, was killed in a alongside other rebels in Syria. Other members of the group, which fought a deadly war against the Lebanese army in 2007, were also reported to have spent time fighting in Syria. They were rumored to have joined the Abdallah Azzam brigades, another radical Palestinian group with ties to al-Qaeda that has claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks launched on Israel from southern Lebanon in the last few years. According to sources in Lebanon’s Palestinian camps, the men have since returned to Lebanon.

 

"Palestinian fighters provide logistical support to Syrian revolutionaries, training them on the use of IEDs as well as on the planning of car bombs,” says Hajj Maher Oueid, the leader of an Islamist party in the Palestinian camp of Ain al-Helweh in South Lebanon.

 

Abu Ghureir al-Traboulsi also fought alongside Fatah al-Islam during its war against the Lebanese army. Now his new frontline is Syria. Traboulsi, who is in his early thirties, says he is motivated by two powerful considerations: revenge and faith.  His father was tortured by the Syrian army in the 1980s during the Syrian military and intelligence apparatuses’ 30-year occupation of Lebanon. Joining the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime was for him the obvious next step. The ruling Assad family is mostly Alawite, an offshoot of Shiism, while the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni. According to Islamist sources in Lebanon, many other Lebanese have joined the uprising for religious reasons or due to family or tribal affiliations, especially those in border areas.

 

The open conflict between Shiite Iran and the mostly Sunni Arab countries has also emboldened Lebanese Sunnis to take sides in the Syria conflict. Since the 2005 assassination of Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, largely blamed on Shiite group Hezbollah—an Iranian and Syrian proxy in Lebanon designated a terrorist group by the United States—the Lebanese Sunni population has been slowly radicalizing. "The policy of Hezbollah targeting Sunnis in Lebanon is seen as a humiliation by all. The only way to stop it is to overthrow Assad,” said Taboulsi.

 

“There is a new holy war taking place in the region between Sunnis and Shiites. After Iraq, it is now taking place in Syria,” he added.

 

Taboulsi crossed the border into Syria, joining the Abu Walid battalion affiliated with the larger al Farouk brigade. The latter, a powerful unit within the rebel Free Syrian Army, is led by Abdul-Razzaq Tlass, the nephew of former Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. Both units are mostly made up of Syrians, though they include a small number of Lebanese, Iraqis, Qataris and Kuwaitis. "These foreign militants are mostly of Syrian origin or married to Syrians," said Traboulsi. He participated in several military operations targeting Syrian army barracks as well as one on the headquarters of the Syrian Intelligence services.  Such attacks are usually planned by the FSA’s military council and facilitated by double agents, mostly soldiers still operating within the ranks of the regime forces.

 
While at the beginning of the uprising in Syria nearly two years ago, the role of jihadist fighters was only marginal, it seems to be growing every day along with the regime’s brutal response.

 
Taboulsi watches videos he has filmed in Syria of men carrying Kalashnikovs and RPGs, training or taking position around a tank.  

 
“Every evening we pray before we go to war against the Assad regime in order to be guaranteed a place in paradise if we die,” he says with a smile.  (Mona Alami, USA Today)